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FIDE Congress 2020 – EU Competition Law and the Digital 
Economy: United Kingdom Report* 
Andriani Kalintiri** and Ryan Stones*** 
Abstract 
This report was prepared for the 29th biennial Congress of the International Federation of 
European Law (FIDE) to be held in The Hague in May 2020. It is the national report for the 
United Kingdom in response to Topic 3 of the 2020 FIDE Congress, titled ‘EU Competition 
Law and the Digital Economy’. This report offers an overview of UK competition enforcement 
in digital economy markets by answering twelve questions organised into four sections. Part 
A summarises key UK antitrust and merger decisions, agency publications, priorities and goals 
of enforcement in digital economy markets. Part B focuses upon the definition of markets and 
conceptualisation of market power by UK authorities in digital economy cases in light of their 
challenges and particularities. Part C offers a detailed overview of the issues underpinning UK 
antitrust and merger scrutiny in this field: the types of conduct investigated, relevant factors 
and concepts, theories of harm, efficiency justifications and remedies in digital economy 
cases. Finally, Part D identifies the potential for incoherent enforcement in this field from two 
different sources: the overlap between UK competition law and ex ante regulatory regimes 
(e.g. consumer protection, data protection); and the overlap between the powers of various 
UK competition decision-makers (e.g. sectoral regulators, the Competition Appeal Tribunal, 
and the courts). 
 
Keywords: competition, digital economy, antitrust, mergers 
  
                                               
*   This is the report initially submitted to FIDE. The final version published by FIDE may differ. 
**  Lecturer in Competition Law, King’s College London. For correspondence: andriani.kalintiri@kcl.ac.uk. 
*** Lecturer in Law, City, University of London. For correspondence: ryan.stones@city.ac.uk.  
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A. Competition Policy in the Digital Economy: Shift in Focus? 
Question 1 
What are the main cases dealing with the digital economy (focusing on digital businesses or 
on the competition between digital businesses and incumbent operators) initiated and 
completed by your competition authority? 
a. In those cases, have any competition issues been identified which are specific to the digital 
economy and therefore warrant a particular focus on the digital economy in your jurisdiction?  
b. Are other cases currently under investigation? If so, could you give a brief summary of the 
status of these investigations?  
 
Digital markets have been the focus of both antitrust and merger enforcement action by the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and its predecessors, the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) and the Competition Commission (CC).1 
The main antitrust cases dealing with the digital economy completed by the authority are 
listed in Table 1.2 The majority concerned online resale price maintenance (RPM), but the 
CMA has also considered: online sales bans; the use of ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) clauses; 
advertising restrictions; and algorithmic collusion. 
Year Case Issue Outcome 
2019 Digital pianos and digital keyboards3 Online RPM Infringement 
2017 Sports equipment sector4 Online sales ban Infringement 
 Live online auction platform services5 
Exclusivity, MFN clauses, 
advertising restrictions Commitments 
 Light fittings6 Online RPM Infringement 
2016 Online sales of posters and frames7 Algorithmic collusion Infringement 
 Commercial refrigeration8 Online RPM Infringement 
 Bathroom fittings9 Online RPM Infringement 
                                               
1 On 1 April 2014 the functions of the CC and the OFT were transferred to the CMA in accordance with the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA13). Unless otherwise indicated, references to the CMA must also be understood as 
including its predecessors, as appropriate. 
2 As at 13 October 2019. 
3https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/musical-instruments-and-equipment-suspected-anti-competitive-agreements-50565-2.  
4https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/sports-equipment-sector-anti-competitive-practices#infringement-decision.  
5https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/auction-services-anti-competitive-practices. 
6https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/light-fittings-sector-anti-competitive-practices#settlement-and-infringement-decision.  
7https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-sales-of-discretionary-consumer-products.  
8https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/commercial-catering-sector-investigation-into-anti-competitive-practices#settlement-
and-infringement-decision.  
9https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/bathroom-fittings-sector-investigation-into-anti-competitive-practices#infringement-
decision.  
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2014 Mobility aids - Pride10 Online RPM Infringement 
2013 Mobility aids - Roma11 Online sales and price advertising ban Infringement 
Table 1: Digital economy antitrust cases completed by the CMA 
 
Several antitrust investigations relating to the digital economy were closed on 
administrative priority grounds. As Table 2 shows, these involved: online price advertising 
restrictions; digital comparison tools; MFN clauses; and interchange fees for card payments. 
Year Case Issue 
2017 Mobility scooters12 Online price advertising restrictions 
2016 Energy price comparison websites13 Digital comparison tools 
2015 Hotel online booking14 RPM/MFN clauses 
 MasterCard and Visa15 Interchange fees for card payments 
2013 Amazon16 MFN policy 
2011 eBooks17 MFN clauses 
Table 2: Digital economy antitrust cases closed by the CMA on administrative priority grounds 
 
Furthermore, the CMA has investigated several digital economy mergers; Table 3 
provides an indicative list.18 These cases considered a variety of issues, such as payment 
services, cashback websites, credit comparison platforms (CCP) and credit checking tools 
                                               
10https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/investigation-into-agreements-in-the-mobility-aids-sector.  
11https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/investigation-into-agreements-in-the-mobility-aids-sector.  
12https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/medical-equipment-anti-competitive-practices. The case was closed after the restrictions 
in question came to an end. 
13https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/energy-price-comparison-websites-suspected-anti-competitive-agreements. The CMA 
decided the case was no longer an administrative priority, noting the implementation of the remedies from the Energy 
Market investigation and its market study into digital comparison tools.  
14https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/hotel-online-booking-sector-investigation. The OFT concluded a commitment decision 
which was subsequently annulled by the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT)(Skyscanner v CMA [2014] CAT 16). The 
investigation was reopened and then closed on administrative priority grounds, given developments in the hotel online 
booking sector regarding MFN clauses.  
15https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/investigation-into-interchange-fees-mastercard-visa-mifs. This case was no longer a CMA 
priority upon the entry into force of Regulation 2015/751 on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions. 
16https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/amazon-online-retailer-investigation-into-anti-competitive-practices. The case was 
closed when Amazon ended its MFN policy. 
17https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/e-books-investigation-into-anti-competitive-arrangements-between-some-publishers-
and-retailers. The case was investigated by the European Commission (COMP/39847, Ebooks). 
18 Cases where the jurisdictional requirements were not satisfied were not included (e.g. MoneySupermarket/MoneySaving 
Expert (https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/moneysupermarket-moneysavingexpert); Expedia/Trivago 
(https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/expedia-inc-trivago-gmbh)). 
 
2019/06 
 www.city.ac.uk/law 4 
 
(CCT), online food and travel platforms, digital comparison tools and online gambling. The 
majority were cleared in Phase 1, while a few were cleared or cancelled in Phase 2. 
Year Case Market/Sector Outcome 
2019 PayPal/iZettle19 Offline and omni-channel payment services Phase 2 Clearance 
 TopCashBack/Quidco20 Cashback websites Phase 2 Cancellation 
 Experian/ClearScore21 CCPs and CCTs Phase 2 Cancellation 
 eBay/Motors.co.uk22 Online-classified vehicle advertising Phase 1 Clearance 
2018 Nielsen/AdIntel23 Advertising intelligence Phase 2 Clearance 
 Moneysupermarket.com/ Decision Technologies24 Digital comparison tools  Phase 1 Clearance 
 ATG Media Holdings/Lottissimo25 
Live online bidding auction 
platform services Phase 1 Clearance 
 Stars UK/Sky Betting and Gaming26 Online gambling services Phase 1 Clearance 
2017 Just Eat/Hungryhouse27 Online food platforms Phase 2 Clearance 
 Blackbaud/Giving28 Online fundraising platforms Phase 1 Clearance 
2015 CVC Capital Partners/Sky Bet29 
Online payment services for 
online betting and gaming 
services 
Phase 1 Clearance 
2013 
Motorola Mobility 
(Google)/ 
Waze Mobile30 
Turn-by-turn navigation 
applications for mobile 
devices 
Phase 1 Clearance 
 
Web Reservations 
International/ 
Hostelbookers.com31 
Online travel agencies for 
hostel accommodation Phase 1 Clearance 
 Priceline.com/Kayak32 Online travel agents and price comparison site Phase 1 Clearance 
                                               
19https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/paypal-holdings-inc-izettle-ab-merger-inquiry.  
20https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/topcashback-quidco-merger-inquiry.  
21https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/experian-limited-credit-laser-holdings-clearscore.  
22https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/ebay-inc-motors-co-uk-limited-merger-inquiry.  
23https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/nielsen-ebiquity-merger-inquiry.  
24https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/moneysupermarket-com-financial-group-limited-decision-technologies-limited.  
25https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/atg-media-holdings-limited-lot-tissimo-merger-inquiry.   
26https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/stars-uk-sky-betting-and-gaming-merger-inquiry.  
27https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/just-eat-hungryhouse-merger-inquiry.  
28https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/blackbaud-giving-merger-inquiry. 
29https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/cvc-capital-partners-sicav-fis-s-a-sky-bet.  
30https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/motorola-mobility-holding-waze-mobile-ltd.  
31https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/web-reservations-international-hostelbookers-com-ltd.  
32https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/priceline-com-kayak-software-corporation.  
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2012 Digital Property/Zoopla33 Online property advertising portals Phase 1 Clearance 
 Facebook/Instagram34 Virtual networking services Phase 1 Clearance 
 Experian/192business35 Online identity verification and authentication services Phase 1 Clearance 
2011 Amazon/The Book Depository36 Online book retail Phase 1 Clearance 
 Google/BeatThatQuote.com37 
Consumer finance price 
comparison sites Phase 1 Clearance 
Table 3: Digital economy merger investigations by the CMA 
 
At least five digital economy cases are currently pending. Three of them are Phase 1 
merger investigations: Amazon/Deliveroo concerning food delivery services;38 
Salesforce/Tableau Software regarding cloud software and data analytics;39 and Bottomline 
Technologies/Experian concerning payments processing.40 Public information is currently only 
available for Bottomline Technologies/Experian. The CMA has expressed concerns that the 
merged entity may increase prices, reduce product availability or lower investment in 
innovation.41 Unless the parties offer appropriate remedies, the transaction will be referred for 
a Phase 2 investigation. Furthermore, there are at least two antitrust investigations based on 
Article 101 TFEU and Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 (CA1998) in progress. The first 
involves the use of wide MFN clauses by ComparetheMarket, a price comparison website 
(PCW) for home insurance products.42 In November 2018 a Statement of Objections (SO) was 
issued indicating that the practice may have led to higher premiums.43 The second concerns 
online RPM by Fender, a guitar firm, for which an SO was issued in October 2019.44 
Question 2 
Has your competition authority adapted its enforcement practices in order to keep up with the 
pace of digital markets?  
a. How have these adaptations taken shape (legislative changes, policy changes, changes in 
enforcement strategies)? 
b. Which enforcement tools are or have been available in your jurisdiction to this end? Has 
the competition authority drafted reports or explicitly adopted guidelines or binding 
                                               
33https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/digital-property-group-zoopla.  
34https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/facebook-instagram-inc.  
35https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/experian-192business-ltd.  
36https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/amazon-com-inc-the-book-depository-international-ltd.  
37https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/google-beatthatquote-com.  
38https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/amazon-deliveroo-merger-inquiry.  
39https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/salesforce-com-inc-tableau-software-inc-merger-inquiry. 
40https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/bottomline-technologies-de-inc-experian-limited-merger-inquiry.  
41https://www.gov.uk/government/news/merger-of-payment-software-providers-raises-competition-concerns. 
42https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/price-comparison-website-use-of-most-favoured-nation-clauses. 
43https://www.gov.uk/government/news/comparethemarket-home-insurance-deals-could-deny-people-better-prices. 
44https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/musical-instruments-and-equipment-suspected-anti-competitive-agreements-50565-3. 
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administrative rules tailoring competition law and/or enforcement practices to digital 
businesses? 
c. Have legislators or authorities in your jurisdictions been conducting evaluations of 
(competition) policy regarding digital markets? If so, could you summarize the outcome of 
those evaluations? 
 
The CMA has taken several steps to keep up with digital markets, which were identified among 
the themes of ‘particular strategic significance’ in its last two Annual Plans. While there have 
been no legislative changes yet, the authority has been keen to adapt its policy and 
enforcement practices. 
In recent years, the CMA has made effective use of the tools available to it. First, it has 
conducted several antitrust and merger investigations dealing with the digital economy, as 
detailed above. Second, it has completed market studies into the Commercial Use of 
Consumer Data (2015)45 and Digital Comparison Tools (2017)46 and market investigations 
into Payday Lending (2015)47 and Retail Banking (2017).48 Third, it has enforced consumer 
protection legislation in a wide range of issues relating to the digital economy, such as 
secondary ticketing websites,49 online dating services,50 online gambling,51 and online reviews 
and endorsements.52 Fourth, it has built its knowledge by drafting a working paper on Pricing 
Algorithms,53 conducting a literature review on Online Search54 and commissioning a report 
on the ‘Ex-post Assessment of Merger Control Decisions in Digital Markets’ (Lear Report).55 
Fifth, in October 2018 it established a Data, Technology and Analytics (DaTA) unit so as to 
boost its digital capabilities.56 
Competition in the digital economy has also attracted the attention of the UK Government, 
which invited the CMA’s advice on necessary legislative and institutional reforms and 
appointed a Digital Competition Expert Panel led by Professor Furman to make 
recommendations on how the existing competition framework could be further enhanced to 
meet the challenges of the digital economy. In February 2019 the CMA’s Chairman proposed 
                                               
45https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/commercial-use-of-consumer-data.  
46https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/digital-comparison-tools-market-study.  
47https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/payday-lending-market-investigation.  
48https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/review-of-banking-for-small-and-medium-sized-businesses-smes-in-the-uk.  
49https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/secondary-ticketing-websites.  
50https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-dating-services.  
51https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-gambling.  
52https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-endorsements-potential-non-disclosure.  
53https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/746353/Algorithms
_econ_report.pdf.  
54https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/607077/online-
search-literature-review-7-april-2017.pdf.  
55https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/803576/CMA_past
_digital_mergers_GOV.UK_version.pdf.  
56https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/781151/Letter_fro
m_Andrew_Tyrie_to_the_Secretary_of_State_BEIS.pdf. 
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several reforms, including the sharpening-up of the interim measures regime, the broadening 
of the authority’s powers to gather information and impose sanctions and the strengthening of 
consumer enforcement.57 In March 2019 the Digital Competition Expert Panel published its 
Report on Unlocking Digital Competition (Furman Report), which made six strategic 
recommendations (and identified twenty related actions): creating a ‘Digital Markets Unit’ with 
regulatory functions for digital platforms of ‘strategic market status’; revisiting merger 
assessment in digital markets, including the possible adoption of a new ‘balance of harms’ 
test; updating the CMA’s enforcement tools against anticompetitive conduct, including greater 
use of interim measures; monitoring machine learning and artificial intelligence developments; 
conducting a market study into digital advertising; and international engagement on future 
steps.58 
The CMA welcomed the recommendations of the Furman Report, which supported to a 
large extent some of its own reform proposals. While the authority considers that existing 
antitrust and merger tools have worked well and remain relevant in the digital world, they could 
be strengthened in a number of ways to effectively tackle harms in fast-paced digital markets 
and better protect consumers. Against this backdrop, in July 2019 the CMA published its 
Digital Markets Strategy.59 Its five aims are to use existing tools effectively and efficiently in 
digital markets; to build knowledge and capability to better understand digital business models; 
to adapt available tools where necessary to meet the challenges of the digital economy; to 
support the Government’s consideration of new regulatory structures in digital markets; and 
to consider potential digital-focused remedies, such as data portability or interoperability. In 
working towards these aims, the CMA has identified seven priorities: (a) to use its existing 
powers to address poor practices and concerns in digital markets; (b) to continue and expand 
the work of the DaTA unit; (c) to conduct a market study on online platforms and digital 
advertising, launched at the same time as its Strategy;60 (d) to review its approach to digital 
mergers, taking into account the feedback provided by stakeholders in the call for information 
which the authority launched in early June 2019;61 (e) to carry out policy work on a possible 
‘Digital Markets Unit’; (f) to support the Government, while it considers the CMA Chairman’s 
proposals for reforms; and (g) to increase its efforts towards international cooperation so as 
                                               
57 Other proposals include an overriding ‘consumer interest’ duty, increasing the effectiveness and flexibility of market 
studies and market investigations, and the potential imposition of individual responsibility in competition and consumer 
enforcement. 
58https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/unlocking-digital-competition-report-of-the-digital-competition-expert-
panel.  
59 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-launches-digital-markets-strategy.  
60 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-platforms-and-digital-advertising-market-study.  
61 https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/call-for-information-digital-mergers.  
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to capitalise on the synergies between its own digital markets work and that of its 
counterparts.62 
The UK Government is due to publish a Competition Green Paper later in the year 
analysing the recommendations in the Furman Report, but it has already indicated its 
keenness to take the proposal for a Digital Markets Unit forward.63 
Question 3 
Is your domestic competition law using the consumer welfare standard as its specific goal?  
a. If no, what other standards are being relied on as the goal of competition law enforcement?  
b. If yes, how do you interpret the consumer welfare standard in your jurisdiction?  
c. Has this standard been applied consistently in cases dealing with digital businesses or with 
competition between digital businesses and incumbent operators? 
 
The CMA’s statutory duty is to ‘promote competition, both within and outside the United 
Kingdom, for the benefit of consumers’.64 An analogous duty is borne by many sector 
regulators with concurrent competition powers.65 The consumer welfare standard best 
portrays the goal of competition law in the UK.66 This is interpreted broadly and not confined 
to prices. In its Prioritisation Principles, the CMA describes consumer welfare as including 
‘better value for consumers in terms of price, quality, range or service, both static and 
dynamic’, as well as ‘non-financial detriment such as the avoidance of physical harm or 
emotional distress’.67 Furthermore, the authority recognises that ‘increased competition in the 
market may deliver further consumer benefits over time resulting from the improved 
competitive process’.68 
In its recent proposals to the Government, the CMA advocated an overriding ‘consumer 
interest’ duty, on the ground that the current one may constrain it ‘from acting to protect 
consumers’ interests unless doing so through purely competition-based remedies’.69 In the 
CMA’s view, such a new duty would be better aligned with its strategic mission ‘to make 
                                               
62 These priorities echo the Government’s 2019 Strategic Steer 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/818676/cma-
strategic-steer-responses.pdf). 
63 See https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-opening-london-tech-week-10-june-2019 and 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/808272/Smart-Data-
Consultation.pdf, 17. 
64 ERRA13, §25(3).  
65 E.g. the Office of Communication (Ofcom) is required to ‘further the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where 
appropriate by promoting competition’ (s3(1)(a)-(b) Communications Act 2003). 
66 The Government’s 2015 Strategic Steer to the CMA noted that it should ‘conclude enforcement cases as quickly as 
possible ensuring that it has the maximum possible positive impact on the welfare of consumers’ 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/481040/BIS-15-659-
government-response-governments-strategic-steer-to-the-competition-and-markets-authority.pdf). 
67 §3.1.  
68 §4.10. 
69 Chairman’s Letter (n 56), 9-12. 
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markets work well in the interests of consumers, business and the economy’ and would enable 
it to address new and emerging forms of consumer detriment, although it should not constrain 
it ‘from intervening to promote and protect the competitive process’.70 By contrast, considering 
the need for a paradigm shift, the Furman Report concluded that the current goal is appropriate 
and that ‘UK competition policy should remain rooted in the consumer welfare standard as 
properly conceived, giving sufficient focus to non-price elements of competition, and to 
innovation in particular’.71 
Because the consumer welfare standard is conceptualised in broad terms, it can be 
applied flexibly, and it is difficult to tell whether it has been enforced in a consistent manner in 
digital economy cases. In antitrust investigations, the focus has predominantly been on price 
effects, which is unsurprising considering the nature of the practices involved (online sales 
limitations, algorithmic collusion, MFN clauses). In merger cases, non-price effects - for 
instance, on quality and innovation - have been taken into account.72 For example, in 
Experian/ClearScore the CMA provisionally found that the merger would reduce the parties’ 
incentives to invest in improvements and product developments, thereby reducing the rate of 
innovation.73 Or in Google/Waze the OFT considered whether the merger would dampen 
Google’s incentives to innovate and improve quality as a result of the loss of an innovative 
rival.74 Nevertheless, merger control has been criticised for paying insufficient attention to 
long-run effects - for instance, on quality and choice -75 while the Lear Report identified gaps 
in the UK authorities’ approach to digital mergers which may have led to insufficient 
consideration of non-price effects.76 
It should be noted that in the UK mergers are subject to a public interest test, where they 
pertain to media plurality, national security and financial stability.77 The House of Lords 
Communications Committee recently recommended a public-interest test for data-driven 
mergers so as to manage the accumulation of data.78 
B. Market Definition and Market Power 
Question 4 
How does your competition authority define the market with regard to digital economy players? 
                                               
70 ibid. 
71 Furman Report (n 58), §3.18-3.23. 
72 See also: Merger Guidelines, §4.2.3 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284449/OFT1254.pd
f). 
73 §11.69. 
74 §28. 
75 Furman Report (n 58) p12 and §4.12. 
76 Lear Report (n 55), Part II.6. 
77 Enterprise Act 2002, Chapter 2. 
78 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldcomuni/299/29907.htm, §149. 
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a. Are the traditional price/product and geographic area criteria being relied on in ongoing or 
completed investigations or is a new data-focused market test taking shape?  
b. Does your authority make use of a specific methodology when defining markets for online 
platforms? (e.g. a distinction between transaction and non-transaction platforms or between 
business models and functionalities) 
c. Is the particular nature of platform markets taken into consideration in the market definition 
practice of your jurisdiction?  
d. Have the authorities or courts been seized with cases involving zero price markets, and 
how did they define the relevant market? 
 
In antitrust cases the CMA applies the Market Definition Guidelines,79 while in merger cases 
it applies the Merger Guidelines.80 The approach in each document is similar but not identical. 
Two-sided markets, for instance, are considered only in the latter and are defined as ‘platforms 
(…) that intermediate between distinct and unrelated groups of customers’.81 Nevertheless, 
the discussion thereof is brief. The Merger Guidelines simply note the relevance of indirect 
network effects and that ‘prices charged to each set of customers take account of the need to 
get both sets on board’ and acknowledge the difficulties of conducting the hypothetical 
monopolist test given that:  ‘(i) there is no single price to both sets of customers to which to 
apply a SSNIP; (ii) the effect of a SSNIP on the demand of one set of customers may be 
exacerbated by indirect network effects; and (iii) the constraints on the merging firms' products 
may come not only from other two-sided intermediaries but also from 'one-sided' firms serving 
one set of customers’. 82 
In principle, the CMA relies on traditional product and geographic area criteria when 
defining markets in cases involving digital economy players. It generally identifies the 
overlapping activities of the parties in the narrowest plausible market and then examines 
whether this should be widened in view of demand-side and supply-side substitution. 
Depending on the circumstances, a range of factors may be considered, including the features 
of the service or product;83 product or customer segmentation;84 the existence of alternative 
sales, distribution or marketing channels;85 and different business models and monetisation 
strategies.86 Where the evidence on substitutability is ambiguous, the CMA typically takes a 
cautious approach, proceeding with the narrower definition.87 Two-sided markets in particular 
                                               
79https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284423/oft403.pdf. 
80https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284449/OFT1254.p
df 
81 Ibid, §5.2.20. 
82 ibid. 
83 e.g. TopCashBack/Quidco, §34-59; Experian/ClearScore, §9.26-9.35; eBay/Motors, §35-36; Blackbaud/Giving, §22-26. 
84 e.g. PayPal/iZettle, §6.11-6.24; Experian/ClearScore, §9.19-2.25; eBay/Motors, §37-38; Priceline/Kayak, §29-32. 
85 e.g. Experian/ClearScore, §9.10-9.18; Priceline/Kayak, §18-21; Amazon/The Book Depository, §9-26. 
86 e.g. MoneySupermarket/Decision Technologies, §37-41; JustEat/Hungryhouse, §2.16-2.34; Google/Waze, §15, 20; 
Priceline/Kayak, §8-13, 43. 
87 e.g., TopCashBack/Quidco, §35-47; MoneySupermarket/Decision Technologies, §53-58. cf Kayak/Priceline, §41-45 and 
Lear Report (n 55) pp 89-90. 
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have been considered in several merger cases, including Google/BeatThatQuote, Digital 
Property/Zoopla, Facebook/Instagram, Priceline/Kayak, Google/Waze, JustEat/Hungryhouse, 
ATG Media/Lottissimo, Moneysupermarket/Decision Technologies, eBay/Motors, 
Experian/ClearScore and TopCashBack/Quidco.88 Except ATG Media/Lottissimo,89 all other 
mergers involved zero price markets and the importance of indirect network effects has been 
generally noted.90 
Nevertheless, the two-sidedness of digital platforms was arguably insufficiently 
appreciated in earlier market definitions. According to the Lear Report, in certain cases – for 
instance, Facebook/Instagram and Google/Waze – too much emphasis was placed on product 
functionalities and on the users’ side of the market and little attention was given to business 
models and monetization strategies, a shortcoming which possibly undermined the 
subsequent assessment of these transactions.91 In recent decisions though, the CMA’s 
approach has been more sophisticated. In JustEat/Hungryhouse, the authority distinguished 
between platforms that facilitate transactions and those that do not. While in the latter case 
two separate markets may be defined, in the former ‘a single market definition is appropriate, 
which takes account of the competitive constraints on both sides of the market and assesses 
the hypothetical monopolist’s ability to increase the price of concluding a transaction, given 
the number of close substitutes on each side and the impact of any indirect network effects 
on the platform’.92 The same approach was followed in TopCashBack/Quidco93 and 
Experian/ClearScore.94 In all three cases, the CMA explained the difficulties of implementing 
the hypothetical monopolist test and considered demand-side and supply-side substitution 
based on the evidence. In JustEat/Hungryhouse the authority also noted that ‘where products 
and services on one side of the market are provided ‘free’ of charge, other dimensions of 
competition, such as quality, may be a more important measure of substitution than price on 
that side of the market’.95 
While it is impossible to provide an exhaustive account, it is worth mentioning the most 
recent digital market definitions. In JustEat/Hungryhouse, food-ordering marketplaces were 
deemed substitutable with food ordering and logistics specialists but not with direct ordering 
and vertically integrated food chains.96 In eBay/Motors, the CMA noted the categorisation of 
                                               
88 See also Live Online Auction Platform Services, a Chapter II commitment decision. 
89 §29. 
90 e.g. TopCashBack/Quidco, §25; Experian/ClearScore, §7.8; eBay/Motors, §37; JustEat/Hungryhouse, §4.9; Google/Waze, 
§19; Google/BeatThatQuote, §11. 
91 Lear Report (n 55) p 117. 
92 §4.11 
93 §24-28 (see also Issues Statement in Phase 2, §13, 21). 
94 §9.6. 
95 §4.10. 
96 ibid, §4.26. 
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online advertising into search, non-search and classified but did not consider it appropriate to 
widen the market for online classified vehicle advertising to include other forms of advertising, 
such as paid search or social media.97 In Experian/ClearScore the authority provisionally 
found that CCPs are not substitutable with other marketing channels, including lenders’ own 
websites and traditional offline channels, and online advertising.98 The CMA also considered 
that paid-for and free CCTs are part of the same market, their different monetisation not 
preventing this conclusion.99 In TopCashBack/Quidco the authority concluded that cashback 
websites were not substitutable with PCWs, money-saving content websites and deal 
aggregator websites.100 Finally, PayPal/iZettle should be highlighted as one of the identified 
markets - omni-channel payment services by the same provider - was/is still nascent. 
Remarking that such services are an emerging trend and may develop rapidly with merchants’ 
demand, the CMA considered industry views on how this market might evolve ‘in the near 
future, rather than focusing solely on existing requirements and solutions’.101 
Question 5 
How is market power established in the practice of your competition authority in cases relating 
to digital economy players?  
a. Are market shares being relied on?  
b. Is a business’ power in related markets taken into consideration? If so, how?  
c. Has potential or future competition been taken into account when defining market power? 
Is it used differently for cases in the digital economy?  
d. Can you notice variations in the use of the concept of market power in digital economy 
cases compared to other fields? 
 
In establishing market power, the CMA considers undertakings’ shares over time and the 
strength of any competitive constraints, including existing competition, potential competition 
and buyer power.102 With regards to mergers, since market power is assessed in the context 
of the examination of the competitive effects of the transaction, this answer should be read in 
conjunction with the response to Question 7. Generally, the conventional approach applies to 
both antitrust and merger digital economy cases. Large market shares may be cause for 
concern,103 although in merger investigations incremental increases will typically point towards 
the opposite conclusion.104 Furthermore, a business’ power in related markets may be taken 
into consideration. An abuse may be found ‘where an undertaking that is dominant in one 
                                               
97 §32-36. 
98 §9.18. 
99 ibid, §9.28-9.49. 
100 §54. 
101 §6.49-6.75. 
102 For antitrust cases, see Guidelines on the Assessment of Market Power, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284400/oft415.pdf. 
For merger cases, see Merger Guidelines, §5.3-5.6 and 5.7-5.9. 
103 e.g. Live Online Auction Platform Services, §3.11; TopCashBack/Quidco, §65. 
104 e.g. Google/BeatThatQuote, §56-67; Blackbaud/Giving, §70. 
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market commits an abuse in a different but closely associated market’.105 Likewise, in 
horizontal mergers the CMA may ‘consider the possible impact on other markets’, and for non-
horizontal mergers it will analyse the consequences for upstream, downstream, and related 
markets.106 
That said, some particularities are worth noting. First, while market shares provide the 
starting point for assessing the firms’ competitive positions, the proper metric may be 
uncertain. In Facebook/Instagram the OFT relied on app downloads,107 but this measure did 
not reflect user engagement; actual usage data would have arguably been a better proxy.108 
In Priceline/Kayak the OFT had reservations about relying on internet traffic and considered 
net revenue, volume and gross booking value as more appropriate benchmarks.109 More 
recently, in eBay/Motors the CMA calculated advertising shares by listing revenue, number of 
unique visitors and number of dealers, noting that ‘shares by revenue are likely to provide only 
limited insight into competitive conditions’.110 Differentiated products and business models 
may further complicate this exercise. In Experian/ClearScore, the CMA calculated shares 
based on CCP revenues as consisting in commissions from financial product providers, noting 
though that, due to the different ways in which CCPs attract users - i.e. through a free CCT or 
not - ‘CCP-wide market shares may not fully reflect the strength of competitive constraints 
between different market participants’.111 A similar issue arose in TopCashBack/Quidco.112 
Furthermore, in eBay/Motors and PayPal/iZettle the authority acknowledged that in 
dynamic and fast-growing markets, shares of supply can provide some insight but may not be 
an appropriate guide to the competitive constraints currently faced by the parties, insofar as 
they provide a historical and static picture of competition, and should be thus given relatively 
limited weight.113 In view of this, the CMA has also considered more forward-looking 
measures, in particular new user acquisitions. In PayPal/iZettle, it held that the relative rates 
of new customer acquisition by different mPOS suppliers - as calculated on the basis of app 
downloads, whose limitations as a proxy were noted - are a more accurate measure of their 
competitive positions than shares by transaction volume.114 New user acquisitions based on 
                                               
105 Abuse of dominance, §5.7 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284422/oft402.pdf). 
See also Streetmap v Google Maps [2016] EWHC 253, [15], [98] (markets for online search and online maps were ‘clearly 
related’). 
106 Merger Guidelines, §4.1.6, 5.6.2. 
107 §17. 
108 Lear Report (n 55), §II.28. 
109 §55-57. 
110 §47-48. 
111 §10.8. 
112 §102-105. 
113 eBay/Motors, §49; PayPal/iZettle, §8.88. 
114 §8.41-8.46. 
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subscription numbers were considered in Experian/ClearScore, too, as ‘particularly 
informative of the current competitive dynamic amongst free CCT’.115 
In any event, the presence of strong rivals which can sufficiently constrain the post-merger 
entity will prevent a finding of market power.116 Potential competition may also undermine such 
a provisional conclusion, where entry is timely,117 likely and sufficient. In digital economy 
cases, growth rates,118 future product developments and business plans,119 and entry barriers, 
such as network effects, incumbency advantages and access to data, are particularly relevant. 
In Live Online Auction Platform Services, dominance was provisionally found since ATG was 
‘faced with only a limited degree of potential competition’ due to existing network effects.120 
The absence of barriers to entry was key to the clearance of Web Reservations 
International/Hostelbookers.com: although combining the two largest online hostel booking 
portals, the CMA found that the growth of small, dynamic rivals would maintain sufficient 
competitive pressure.121 By contrast, in TopCashBack/Quidco, the CMA considered that ‘the 
infrastructure and investment required as well as the strategic and marketing barriers mean 
that barriers to entry and expansion are high’.122 The importance of user numbers, incumbency 
and scale to competing successfully was also noted in Experian/ClearScore123 and 
eBay/Motors.124 
Countervailing buyer power has rarely featured in digital economy decisions, though it 
was explicitly rejected in TopCashBack/Quidco: a handful of large advertising buyers could 
not counteract a 90-100% post-merger market share for cashback websites with limited 
switching opportunities.125 
Question 6 
Can you notice a difference in ex post assessments (abuse of dominance cases) and ex ante 
assessments (concentration merger control cases), both in relation to defining markets and 
conceptualizing market power? 
 
It is still too early to identify any clear differences between ex post and ex ante assessments 
of market definition and market power in digital economy cases, since the only abuse of 
                                               
115 §11.8. 
116e.g. Digital Property/Zoopla, §60; Google/Waze, §74; Just Eat/Hungryhouse, §7.2; eBay/Motors, §102. 
117 Usually the CMA considers two years to be timely, but a shorter period may be considered (e.g. Experian/ClearScore, 
§13.26). 
118 e.g. eBay/Motors, §87-88, PayPal/iZettle, §8.34; cf TopBachBack/Quidco, §94. 
119 e.g. Experian/ClearScore, §11.37ff; Just Eat/Hungryhouse, §6.42-6.50. 
120 §3.12. 
121 §103-124. 
122 §142-146. 
123 §7.28-7.29, 13.6-13.61. 
124 §103-106. 
125 §146-151. 
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dominance case in digital markets investigated by the CMA is Live Online Auction Platform 
Services, which closed following commitments. Nevertheless, the CMA is monitoring digital 
economy issues and continues to develop its thinking in the light of relevant cases and market 
investigations and market studies – such as, for instance, the recently initiated market study 
into online platforms and digital advertising – and drawing, where relevant, on its consumer 
enforcement experience in the digital area. 
C. Anticompetitive behaviour in the digital economy 
Question 7 
Which practices in digital markets or involving digital businesses have been analysed in the 
decision-making practices or case law of your jurisdiction? 
a. What types of collusive behaviour have been considered as restrictive by object or by 
effect? Have others been considered as not posing a restriction? What elements have been 
taken into account to reach either conclusion? 
b. Which unilateral practices (tying, refusal to supply, refusing access to data, long term 
predatory pricing) have been considered as abusive? Have others been considered not to 
constitute an abuse? What elements have been taken into account to reach either conclusion? 
c. Have mergers or other concentrations involving digital businesses have been handled by 
your authority? What criteria or tests have been relied on to allow or prohibit the envisaged 
concentration? 
 
The CMA has completed cases analysing the following types of collusive behaviour in the 
digital economy under Chapter I CA1998: 
• Online sales limitations. All such arrangements were deemed to restrict competition by 
object. ‘Recommended’ prices were found to amount to online RPM in Pride,126 Bathroom 
Fittings127 and recently in Digital Pianos and Keyboards, where Casio used automated price 
change alerts to monitor compliance with its ‘guide’.128 Bans on online discounting were 
prohibited in Commercial Refrigeration129 and Light Fittings,130 and formed the basis of the 
subsequently quashed Hotel Online Booking commitments decision.131 A similar SO was 
recently issued to Fender.132 The other mobility scooter decision, Roma, involved 
preclusion of online advertising of offline prices and a ban on internet sales,133 a restriction 
by object to which the CMA returned in its decision against Ping, a customised golf club 
manufacturer.134 
 
                                               
126 §3.197-3.128. 
127 §1.3-1.11, 6.39-6.52. 
128 §3.104-3.110. 
129 §1.3-1.9, 6.42-6.50.  
130 §3.41-3.91, 4.125-4.153. 
131 §5.1-5.14. 
132 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-alleges-guitar-firm-illegally-prevented-price-discounts. 
133 §3.159-3.197. 
134 Sports Equipment, §3.78-3.122.  
 
2019/06 
 www.city.ac.uk/law 16 
 
• Algorithmic price collusion. In Posters and Frames the CMA prohibited such conduct as 
restrictive of competition by object.135 The parties adopted price-matching software for their 
rival products sold via Amazon, autonomously adjusting prices to the same level.136 The 
potential for algorithmic pricing to facilitate explicit and tacit collusion was also noted in the 
CMA’s 2018 Working Paper.137 
 
• MFN clauses. Although the primary concern was RPM, the investigated firms in Hotel 
Online Booking agreed, in response to market feedback, not to enforce or use MFN clauses 
to ensure RPM did not materialise indirectly.138 
 
MFN clauses were also the subject of the only digital markets decision pursuant to Chapter II 
CA1998. Live Online Auction Platform Services involved platforms bringing together auction 
houses and consumers to facilitate real-time online bids at offline auctions.139 Alongside 
exclusivity obligations and restrictions on advertising competitors,140 MFN clauses prevented 
auction houses from securing agreements with rival platforms offering more favourable terms 
to bidders. These were judged to act as a financial penalty against auction houses agreeing 
lower fees with rival platforms, who would be obliged to give bidders on the dominant firm’s 
system the same benefits but at its higher commission rate.141 
One practice deemed not to breach Chapter I CA1998 was a ‘one other portal’ quasi-
exclusivity rule for online platforms. The CAT and the Court of Appeal agreed that 
OnTheMarket, an online property portal created by an association of agents, could restrict 
users from listing properties on more than one other online portal, as this was objectively 
necessary for its effective operation.142 The High Court has also ruled that Google’s 
preferential display of its own map service did not breach the Chapter II prohibition. Based on 
the evidence, such presentation was not reasonably likely to appreciably affect competition by 
foreclosing rival online map providers.143 
                                               
135 §5.42-5.50. 
136 ibid, §3.62-3.93. 
137 Pricing Algorithms (n 53) 23-31.  
138 §4.16, 4.6, 6.39-6.42. Later quashed by the CAT and closed by the CMA on priority grounds, although the authority 
continued to monitor market developments (n 14). 
139 §2.15, 2.19. 
140 §2.3, 2.23-2.30. Exclusivity inhibited rivals from acquiring scale and network effects promoting grow; advertising 
restrictions entrenched the incumbent’s position: §3.15. 
141 ibid, §3.15. 
142 Agents' Mutual v Gascoigne Halman [2017] CAT 1. 
5; [2019] EWCA Civ 24. 
143 Streetmap (n 105), [99]-[141]. 
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The CMA has mostly engaged with the digital economy through merger control. Although 
certain transactions fell short of the jurisdictional requirements,144 the majority have been 
cleared in Phase 1. In determining whether a merger has resulted or is expected to result in a 
substantial lessening of competition (SLC),145 the CMA applies the Merger Guidelines and 
compares its effects against the foreseeable competitive situation absent the concentration, 
i.e. the counterfactual.146 As noted in Question 5, market shares, existing competition and 
countervailing factors, such as barriers to entry and buyer power, are among the relevant 
factors when conducting the SLC analysis. Efficiency arguments, considered in Question 8, 
are also pertinent. In horizontal mergers, the closeness of competition between the parties - 
as demonstrated by the similarity of pricing147 or service offered;148 customer perceptions as 
to their comparative functionality;149 the extent of switching between them or to other rivals;150 
and other considerations151 - is another important aspect. In the few non-horizontal mergers 
in digital markets reviewed by the authority, the ordinary analytical framework of ability and 
incentive to foreclose and competitive effect was applied, but no concerns were identified.152 
While some early decisions did not squarely address possible digital economy 
implications,153 such considerations have featured more prominently in recent merger 
analysis.  
Firstly, although in most cases the pre-existing conditions of competition were taken as 
the relevant benchmark, more competitive counterfactuals have been occasionally 
considered. In Experian/ClearScore the CMA rejected the parties’ claim that rivals would exert 
greater competitive constraints in the future owing to regulatory and technological 
developments, since their impact was not sufficiently foreseeable.154 In contrast, in 
PayPal/iZettle the authority considered whether greater future competition between the 
merging parties was foreseeable enough to be reflected in the counterfactual155 and 
concluded that, absent the acquisition, PayPal would have strong incentives to improve its 
offering.156 The Lear Report also urged the CMA to better acknowledge more competitive 
                                               
144 e.g MoneySupermarket/MoneySavingExpert; Expedia/Trivago. 
145 ss35-36 Enterprise Act 2002. 
146 § 4.3. 
147 Amazon/Book Depository, §55; Digital Property/Zoopla, §38; Blackbaud/Giving, §48. 
148 Priceline.com/Kayak, §58; eBay/Motors, §52-57; TopCashBack/Quidco, §67. 
149 Blackbaud/Giving, §48-51; Experian/ClearScore, §58-60. 
150 Amazon/Book Depository, §66-72, 83; Blackbaud/Giving, §56-60. 
151 e.g. brand recognition (Blackbaud/Giving, §50), variable consumer uptake (Facebook/Instagram, §17-21; 
Experian/192business, §34), online customers’ location (Stars/Sky Betting, §64-67). 
152 Merger Guidelines, §5.6. e.g. CVC Capital/Sky Bet, §49-70; Experian/ClearScore, §12.1-12.53; Google/BeatThatQuote, 
§94-109; Moneysupermarket.com/Decision Technologies, §158-167; Blackbaud/Giving, §76-81. 
153 e.g Zipcar/StreetCar. 
154 §12-14, 6.3-6.6, 6.8-6.14. 
155 It further denied that iZettle would be a stronger competitor in the omni-channel market: §7.49-7.65. 
156 ibid, §7.32-7.42. 
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counterfactuals where small, innovative, but hitherto unprofitable acquisitions could grow to 
challenge the acquirer.157 
Secondly, merger analysis has incorporated other digital economy factors. Multi-homing, 
for instance, has been taken to indicate the ease of switching, thus mitigating the likelihood of 
post-merger exercises of market power.158 In Just Eat/Hungryhouse the CMA investigated 
whether customers may cut out the intermediary and go directly to the supplier-side, thereby 
constraining the market power of the platform.159 In Digital Property/Zoopla the authority noted 
that network effects generated by the scale of the merging parties may inhibit the growth and 
competitive pressure of smaller rivals, while conversely the significant network effects enjoyed 
by larger rivals may limit the post-merger entity’s ability to exercise market power.160 The 
former phenomenon was important in provisionally prohibiting the Experian/ClearScore 
acquisition, as combining the two-sided user groups of their CCPs would inhibit customer 
switching.161 Furthermore, in Just Eat/Hungryhouse the CMA rejected the parties’ claim that 
network effects led to a ‘winner-takes-all’ market for online food ordering platforms.162 
Last but not least, the general opportunities presented by the digital economy have been 
referenced as reducing barriers to entry, such as the ease of new app development163 or 
producers’ use of online trading platforms (Amazon Marketplace, eBay).164 
As noted earlier, the CMA recently launched a call for views on its approach to the 
assessment of digital mergers to inform a review of the existing Merger Guidelines. 
Importantly, the authority invited thoughts, among others, on the market features that are likely 
to be relevant to the assessment of mergers in digital markets – such as their multi-sided 
nature; the fact that users may pay for products or services through non-monetary means -
e.g. through the provision of personal data; the relevance of data assets for competition; and 
the importance of network effects.165 
 
Question 8 
What reasons have been offered by the businesses concerned to justify (prima facie) 
anticompetitive behaviour? 
                                               
157 Lear Report (n 55), iv, xiv. 
158 Google/BeatThatQuote, §51; Blackbaud/Giving, §66-69; Just Eat/Hungryhouse, §6.71, 6.74; Experian/ClearScore, 
§10.115. 
159 §6.132-6.143. 
160 §32, 39, 44.  
161 §10.121-10.122. 
162 §6.57, 6.80-6.94. 
163 Facebook/Instagram, §36. 
164 Amazon/Book Depository, §109, 114, 116. 
165https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/805962/CMA_call_
for_information_on_digital_mergers.pdf. 
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a. Have economic efficiency justifications been offered by digital economy players to justify 
certain types of behaviour considered as anticompetitive? If so, please summarize them.  
b. Have these justifications been accepted or rejected by your authority in the cases in which 
they were offered? 
c. Has the multi-sidedness of markets been factored into the assessment of potential efficiency 
justifications?  
d. Does your authority also take justifications other than those grounded in economic efficiency 
into account (e.g. in relation to innovations brought by digital players)? Have such justifications 
also played a role in permitting certain types of behaviour in the digital economy? 
 
Efficiency justifications have not featured prominently in digital economy decisions: parties 
have not raised such claims in Chapter I infringements;166 the only Chapter II investigation 
was concluded with commitments; and most mergers have been cleared due to lack of 
concerns whether in Phase 1 or 2, while some prima facie problematic mergers were 
cancelled.167 
Nevertheless, in Roma and Pride the firms argued that online sales restrictions and RPM 
were necessary to prevent internet distributors free-riding upon the investments of brick-and-
mortar shops, where customers could physically inspect scooters and receive post-sales 
services.168 They argued that the rise of internet sellers with lower operating costs 
necessitated substantial protection for offline distributors from free-riding and undercutting. 
These efficiencies were dismissed as lacking in evidence as to whether they mitigated free-
riding, outweighed the resultant higher prices, or couldn’t be similarly achieved through 
incorporating pre-/post-sales services into selective distribution agreements. The free-rider 
argument was also advanced by Ping to justify an online sales ban protecting its offline 
distributors’ investments in customisation services,169 but was supplemented by the claim that 
the measure was necessary to protect its luxury brand image for personalised clubs.170 The 
CMA rejected this latter argument as an objective justification or mitigating efficiency for the 
practice.171 An online sales ban was not indispensable for customers to acquire personalised 
clubs, with a range of less restrictive alternatives available.172 
Digital Property/Zoopla acknowledged the multi-sidedness of online property portals and 
recognised the merged entity’s greater network effects as facilitating more effective 
                                               
166 Bathroom Fittings; Commercial Refrigeration; Posters and Frames; Light Fittings. 
167 Note Experian/ClearScore (paras 13.62-13.65) where the CMA concluded that the efficiencies offered were outside its 
remit (international growth) or insufficiently evidenced (stimulating innovation). 
168 Roma, §3.206-3.230; Pride, §3.231-3.243. 
169 Sports Equipment, §4.89-4.92. Rejected as distributors already had to maintain a physical shop and their customisation 
costs were recouped. 
170 ibid, §3.97-3.101, 4.83-4.88. 
171 ibid, §4.93-4.156, 4.208-4.249. The CMA’s extensive analysis of objective justifIcation was deemed an error of law: Ping 
Europe v CMA [2018] CAT 13, [97]-[100]. 
172 ibid, §4.120-4.141 (e.g. online promotion of customisation, offering customisation online, interactive personalisation 
advice). 
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competitive pressure upon the market leader, Rightmove.173 Network effects on two-sided 
markets made it difficult for smaller platforms to grow organically, an issue eased by 
accumulating scale through mergers.174 The pro-competitive consequences of strengthening 
the merged entity’s network effects through combining their users and agents thus factored 
heavily in the clearance decision.175 
Lastly, while not technically justificatory efficiencies, the CMA has occasionally noted the 
procompetitive rationale for otherwise unproblematic digital economy mergers. These have 
included increasing scale to compete more effectively and reduce costs,176 combining differing 
business expertise,177 and to facilitate entry into new geographic markets.178 
Question 9 
Have you witnessed the emergence of specific theories of harm tailored to digital markets?  
a. How is harm defined and where does it differ from theories of harm in other sectors? 
b. Do arguments focused on innovation play a role in determining the presence or absence of 
harm to competition? 
c. What standard of proof is relied on to establish harm to competition? If likelihood evidence 
is used, what level of probability is defined as a threshold for intervention? 
 
The CMA has routinely stressed that pre-existing concepts are sufficient to meet issues arising 
in digital economy markets; offline antitrust principles continue to apply.179 Whilst some of the 
practices which give rise to harm may differ in the online and offline world, the underlying 
theories of harm that have been investigated (or posited) in digital markets are in many cases 
not new. However, with the abundance of merger clearances and the relatively small number 
of infringement decisions, there have been limited opportunities for experimentation. 
Chapter I infringement decisions concerning online selling restrictions are based upon 
similar theories of competitive harm. Internet sales bans soften price competition amongst 
online and offline outlets, restrict retailers from accessing the broad consumer base offered 
by the internet, limit consumers to local distributors, prevent 24-hour purchases, and hinder 
the use of online tools that facilitate shopping around (search engines, PCWs).180 The theory 
                                               
173 §46-59. 
174 ibid, §48, 53-54, 56. 
175 ibid, §61, 70. 
176 Google/BeatThatQuote, §8; Just Eat/Hungryhouse, §3.7; PayPal/iZettle, §4.6. 
177 Stars/Sky Betting, §10; PayPal/iZettle, §4.6. 
178 ATG Media/Lottissimo, §12. 
179 CMA Response: Online Platforms and the EU Digital Single Market 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/502607/Response_t
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o_EC_s_questionnaire_on_the_regulatory_environment_for_platforms.pdf) 2, 6; Pricing Algorithms: (n 53) 5, 27, 31, 47-
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180 Roma, §1.15-1.16; Sports Equipment, §4.53-4.54, 4.72-4.82. 
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of harm underpinning the prohibition of online RPM likewise focuses upon the internet as a 
tool for fierce competition and discounting, which is dulled by the imposition of a singular 
price.181 RPM further prevents the lower overheads of internet distributors from being 
translated into reduced prices,182 and may act as a barrier to entry in markets where small 
firms aggressively discount to acquire scale.183 
The theory of harm relating to MFN clauses in the Live Online Auction Platform Services 
commitments decision was also clear: ‘wide’ MFN clauses may foreclose competing online 
platforms by acting as a financial penalty on auctioneers securing more favourable terms for 
bidders on rival platforms, as they required the investigated firm’s bidders to be given the same 
terms (while still paying its agreed commission fee).184 In the pending investigation into MFN 
clauses and home insurance PCWs, press releases suggest a two-fold theory of harm: that 
‘wide’ MFN clauses prevent price competition between PCWs on discounted insurance to 
consumers; and that they reduce competition on the commission rates charged by PCWs to 
insurance providers which may inflate consumer prices.185 These theories reflect the CMA’s 
broader thinking.186 ‘Wide’ MFNs preventing both service providers and rival PCWs from 
offering more favourable terms have been found to eliminate inter-website price competition 
without convincing efficiency justifications.187 In contrast, ‘narrow’ MFN clauses only 
preventing providers from directly offering services on more favourable terms than the PCW 
are considered less problematic, since they maintain the business credibility of PCWs by 
preventing suppliers from free-riding on their advertising efforts by offering a reduced direct 
price.188 
CMA publications on digital markets have discussed additional theories of harm, 
including: consumer exploitation through price discrimination facilitated by data collected on 
previous online visits, transactions and evidence of shopping around;189 hollowing-out, i.e. 
using the consumer focus upon pricing in digital comparison tools to reduce the quality of the 
product;190 non-resolicitation, i.e. agreements between digital comparison tools and service 
providers preventing the former from contacting previous customers, reducing the visibility of 
                                               
181 Pride, §1.14-1.22; Bathroom Fittings, §1.13-1.16, 4.8-4.21, 4.24-4.25; Commercial Refrigeration, §4.6-4.31; Light Fittings, 
§3.25-3.30. 
182 Bathroom Fittings, §4.19-4.21; Commercial Refrigeration, §4.23-4.35; Light Fittings, §3.28. 
183 Hotel Online Booking, §5.9. 
184 §3.14-3.15. 
185 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/price-comparison-website-use-of-most-favoured-nation-clauses.  
186 Private Motor Insurance Market Investigation: Final Report, §8.1-8.123; Digital Comparison Tools (n 46) 57-60, Appendix 
E. 
187 Digital Comparison Tools (n 46) 57-58, Appendix E. 
188 ibid 59-60 (though recognising their ability to restrict competition under specific circumstances). 
189 Online Targeting of Advertising and Prices: A Market Study (2010); Pricing Algorithms (n 53). 
190 Digital Comparison Tools (n 46) 60-62, Appendix E. 
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offers/competing suppliers, and hampering innovation in targeted marketing;191 and non-brand 
bidding/negative keywords matching, i.e. agreements between rival brands to prevent each 
other’s products/services being simultaneously advertised in paid online search results when 
specific brands or particular keywords are input.192 
The primary theory of harm in digital economy horizontal mergers coheres with other 
enforcement: that the loss of actual competition between rivals may create or strengthen a 
position of market power, usually through subsequent price rises,193 but sometimes potentially 
manifest as a reduced range of products/services194 or degradation in quality.195 Occasionally 
the CMA has noted that increased market power may dull future incentives to invest in 
innovation, but – as suggested by the Furman Report196– this theory of harm has not been 
substantiated in detail.197 Despite the dearth of detailed assessments in digital economy 
mergers of coordinated198 and unilateral non-horizontal effects, the CMA has seemingly 
maintained pre-existing theories of harm.199 As evidenced by its analysis of vertical mergers, 
the novelty derives more from the means by which such harms to competition may be 
achieved: manipulation of search engine results,200 preferential treatment of online platforms 
by related PCWs,201 or deteriorating interoperability between social media networks and photo 
sharing apps.202 
A common apprehension in digital markets is the harm to potential future competition and 
innovation resulting from established technology companies acquiring fledgling rivals, whether 
actual or potential.203 Early decisions often dismissed concerns by emphasising incremental 
market share changes, potential future entry with ease and the firms not currently competing 
closely.204 Following Facebook/Instagram, an acquisition cleared largely based on Instagram’s 
then lack of advertising profits,205 Google/Waze was more alive to possible harm to future 
                                               
191 ibid, 64-65, Appendix E. 
192 ibid, 62-64, Appendix E. For a closed investigation concerning this: https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/energy-price-
comparison-websites-suspected-anti-competitive-agreements. 
193 Google/BeatThatQuote, §45-60; Amazon/Book Depository, §49-92; Facebook/Instagram; Just Eat/Hungryhouse, §6.96-
6.97; Experian/ClearScore, §27, 39, 11.3. 
194 Amazon/Book Depository, §97-101; Just Eat/Hungryhouse, ibid; Moneysupermarket.com/Decision Technologies, §79. 
195 Google/Waze, §27; Moneysupermarket.com/Decision Technologies, §79, 108; Experian/ClearScore, §27, 39, 11.3. 
196 Furman Report (n 58) 12, 95. 
197 Google/Waze, §27, 40; Just Eat/Hungryhouse, §6.96-6.97; Moneysupermarket.com/Decision Technologies, §79, 108; 
Experian/ClearScore, §32, 39, 10.133-10.134, 11.69. 
198 This theory of harm is omitted from almost all digital economy merger decisions. For brief consideration: Digital 
Property/Zoopla, §63-65; Experian/192business, §38-43; Priceline.com/Kayak, §81-85. 
199 Merger Guidelines, §5.5, 6.6. 
200 Google/BeatThatQuote, §68-115. 
201 Priceline.com/Kayak, §89-94. 
202 Facebook/Instagram, §30-41. 
203 See Furman Report (n 58) 97. 
204 e.g. Google/BeatThatQuote, §46-47, 56, 61-66; Amazon/Book Depository, §41-46, 108-117. 
205 §23, 29. 
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competition,206 but found little reason to believe that Waze would become a strong competitor 
to Google Maps.207 The most extensive engagement with this theory of harm was in 
PayPal/iZettle. Nevertheless, the CMA found no evidence of an anticompetitive motive for the 
acquisition,208 nor that iZettle was likely to significantly expand its online offering to compete 
with PayPal as an omni-channel payment systems provider.209 
The standard of proof for antitrust infringement decisions and for merger prohibitions is 
the balance of probabilities (i.e. more likely than not).210 The Furman Report advocated a 
‘balance of harms’ approach, whereby merger assessment would weigh up not only the 
likelihood but also the magnitude of both the harms and the benefits of the transaction.211 The 
CMA is concerned that this would be a fundamental shift in merger policy, raising practical 
challenges and possibly unintended consequences.212 
Question 10 
What kind of remedies have been employed in cases relating to digital markets? Do you see 
any differences to remedies in other markets? 
 
Few remedies have been employed in cases relating to digital markets, which have largely 
cohered with other enforcement. 
• As restrictions by object, all Chapter I infringement decisions naturally invited fines under 
s36 CA1998.213 Some were lowered for compliance with the CMA and/or following the 
settlement procedure,214 while others were reduced on appeal.215 Under ss32-33 CA1998, 
the CMA can also impose binding directions; these have been used to order defendants to 
cease adopting and enforcing the prohibited contractual terms,216 where the investigated 
conduct has not already ended.217 
 
• The commitments secured pursuant to ss31A-31E CA1998 in Live Online Auction Platform 
Services simply prevented the investigated conduct: the firm would not enter contracts 
limiting auction houses from using other platforms, negotiating better terms, or advertising 
                                               
206 §26, 40. 
207 §37-39, 44-49, 52. 
208 §11, 9.14. 
209 §9.4-9.15. 
210 Tesco v OFT [2012] CAT 31, [88]; IBA Health v OFT [2003] CAT 27 [182]. 
211 pp13, 98-101. 
212https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/788480/CMA_lett
er_to_BEIS_-_DCEP_report_and_recommendations__Redacted.pdf 
213 Though in Posters and Frames one defendant benefitted from immunity, while in Roma and Pride the defendants’ 
turnover fell within the “small agreement” exception (s39(3) CA1998). 
214 Commercial Refrigeration; Digital Pianos. 
215 e.g. Sports Equipment in Ping (n 171). 
216 Roma; Pride; Sports Equipment. 
217 e.g. Bathroom Fittings; Light Fittings. 
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rival services. The commitments in Hotel Online Booking were more proactive. Although 
MFN clauses were subject to cessation, RPM was remedied by commitments permitting 
online travel agents and hotels to discount to membership groups and to publicise their 
ability to do so. However, the decision was subsequently quashed by the CAT in 
Skyscanner.218 
 
• The vast majority of digital economy mergers have been unconditionally cleared without 
the need to consider remedial commitments.219 
 
Although not a decision, the ‘Open Banking’ remedy arising from the retail banking market 
investigation utilised the digital economy to facilitate greater competition.220 To improve 
switching between current accounts, the CMA recommended the development of an open 
application programming interface (API) for banking.221 This would allow intermediaries 
between banks and customers – finance platforms, apps, PCWs – to access up-to-date 
information from major banks and customers to thereby recommend accounts tailored to their 
individual needs.222 
D. Regulatory overlap and enforcement challenges 
Question 11 
Has there been any overlap in practice between ex ante regulation aimed at controlling market 
behaviour – such as, but not limited to, consumer protection legislation, the proposed platform 
Regulation, the GDPR, the geo-blocking Regulation, the ePrivacy Directive and/or proposed 
ePrivacy Regulation, or similar national instruments of legislation in relation to most favoured 
nation clauses– and the enforcement practice of competition authorities?  
a. If no, have steps been taken to tackle potential overlap and conflicts in future cases?  
b. If yes, has this overlap resulted in conflicting interpretations/visions of how digital 
enterprises can behave on the market? 
 
UK competition law is complemented by the following ex ante regulation: 
• The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA2015).227 Part 1 provides consumer rights against 
businesses supplying goods, services and paid-for (only) digital content.223 Part 2 makes 
unfair non-core terms in consumer contracts not binding, with Schedule 2 listing terms 
                                               
218 Skyscanner (n 14). As noted earlier, the CMA took a fresh look at the case but eventually decided to close the 
investigation on administrative priorities grounds. 
219 For a rare example: Mastercard/VocaLink (https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/mastercard-vocalink-merger-inquiry). 
220 Retail Banking Market Investigation Order 2017 (https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/review-of-banking-for-small-and-
medium-sized-businesses-smes-in-the-uk). 
221 Retail Banking Market Investigation: Final Report (https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/review-of-banking-for-small-and-
medium-sized-businesses-smes-in-the-uk) 441-461. 
222 ibid, xxxvii-xxxviii, 441-442. 
223 s33. 
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which may or must be regarded as unfair. The CMA has occasionally indicated how such 
terms might apply in the digital economy.224 
 
• The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (CPRs).230 These 
prohibit unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices. Typically, unfair practices 
contravene requirements of professional diligence.225 This broadly means conduct below 
the standard expected of an honest trader which impairs the average consumer’s ability to 
make an informed choice. The CPRs specifically prohibit misleading actions and 
omissions,226 aggressive practices,227 and a list of conduct ‘in all circumstances considered 
unfair’,228 a number of which are relevant to the digital economy.229 The Electronic 
Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 impose additional information obligations on 
online traders. 
 
• The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003230 and 
the Data Protection Act 2018, the latter of which implements the GDPR.231 These 
constitute the UK data protection regime. 
 
• The Geo-Blocking Regulation232 and the Geo-Blocking (Enforcement) Regulations 
2018, which designated the CMA as the body responsible for enforcing the prohibitions 
included within Articles 3-5. 
 
• Given the UK’s decision to leave the EU, it is unclear whether legal changes will be 
introduced to implement the Platform Regulation.233 The CMA was initially unconvinced 
that such an instrument was necessary, highlighting the risk of diverging online and offline 
obligations, pre-existing sector-specific requirements (e.g. financial lending, real estate) 
and that regulation might insulate incumbent platforms from greater competition.234 Its 
preference was for guidance, self-regulation and ex post competition/consumer protection 
enforcement. 
 
                                               
224 e.g. Consumer Data (n 45) 16. 
225 Regulation 3. 
226 Regulations 5-6. 
227 Regulation 7. 
228 Schedule 1. 
229 e.g. promoting endorsements by users that have been paid for. 
230 Implementing Directive 2002/58/EC. 
231 Regulation 2016/679. 
232 Regulation 2018/302. 
233 Regulation 2019/1150. 
234 CMA Response: Online Platforms (n 179); CMA Response: Regulatory Environment for Platforms (n 179). 
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Although ex ante regulation imposes various requirements on digital economy firms, the 
greatest possibility for overlap derives from ex post enforcement. 
• This is especially true of UK consumer protection law due to the CMA’s dual role. In addition 
to CA1998, the authority also enforces the CRA2015 and the CPRs.235 Consumer 
enforcement is seen as supporting competition through: facilitating well-informed consumer 
decision-making which rewards the best firms; addressing practices which hinder 
transparency or switching; and ensuring a level playing-field of fair business behaviour.236 
This cohesion is demonstrated by investigations into paid-for positive online 
endorsements,237 opaque charges and terms for internet transactions,238 automatic 
renewal of digital services239 and the reliability of internet reviews.240 Other consumer 
protection investigations in digital markets have focused upon preventing exploitation (e.g. 
websites charging for free government services,241 unfair terms and practices by online 
gambling firms)242 and protecting vulnerable groups (e.g. children pressurised to make in-
game/app purchases).243 Although early consumer protection publications in the digital 
economy often marginalised the competition perspective,244 more recently the CMA has 
effectively blended the two.245 While consumer enforcement has been a valuable 
complement to competition enforcement, the inability to order cessation and impose fines 
independently of the courts has led its Chairman to recently note that the CMA’s consumer 
powers are ‘unfit’ for purpose and should be boosted.246 
 
• Data protection and privacy legislation is enforced by the Information Commissioner’s 
Office (ICO). The ICO has often undertaken enforcement action against digital economy 
firms, including fining Uber for failing to protect customer’s data during a cyber-attack,247 
                                               
235 Part 8 of the Enterprise Act. For other regulations enforced: CMA, Consumer Protection: Enforcement Guidance (2016) 
Annex A. 
236 Consumer Protection, ibid §2.2. 
237https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/handpicked-media-ltd-non-disclosure-of-commercial-blogging-activity; 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402215217/http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/consumer-; 
https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/social-media-endorsements. 
238https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/car-rental-intermediaries; https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-hotel-booking. 
239 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-console-video-gaming; https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/anti-virus-software. 
240 e.g. https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-reviews-and-endorsements; https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/fake-and-
misleading-online-reviews. 
241https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121204222607/http://oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/consumer-
enforcement/consumer-enforcement-completed/government-services/. 
242 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-gambling. 
243 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/children-s-online-games. 
244 e.g. Internet Shopping: An OFT Market Study (2007); Online Targeting (n 189); Protecting Consumers Online: A Strategy 
for the UK (2010). 
245 e.g. Consumer Data (n 45) 10, 95; CMA Response: Online Platforms (n 179).  
246 Chairman’s Letter (n 56) 20-21. 
247 https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2018/11/ico-fines-uber-385-000-over-data-
protection-failings/ 
 
2019/06 
 www.city.ac.uk/law 27 
 
penalising Facebook for not sufficiently guarding user data from app developers,248 and an 
undertaking from WhatsApp not to share data with Facebook until it had met concerns 
about data protection.249 It has also published related materials on privacy and data in 
mobile apps,250 cloud computing,251 social networks252 and a report on big data, AI and 
machine learning.253 Some of the CMA’s consumer protection investigations have also 
touched on privacy254 and its publications have occasionally raised related issues.255 
Rather than inconsistent aspirations, its Report into the commercial use of consumer data 
viewed competition, consumer protection, and privacy as operating in tandem: of firms 
competing in a “race to the top” to offer users the most protective and transparent data 
collection policy.256 The on-going market study into online platforms and digital advertising 
will also look at consumer control over data collection practices, particularly assessing 
measures to improve transparency and consent for data collected for sale to advertisers.257 
 
• As of yet, there has been no enforcement pursuant to the Geo-Blocking Regulation. 
Whether the Platform Regulation will apply in the UK from July 2020 is currently unknown. 
 
Question 12 
Which authorities are responsible for enforcing competition law in the digital economy in your 
jurisdiction?  
a. Are the same authorities entrusted with the enforcement of ex ante digital economy 
regulation (such as the GDPR and the geo-blocking Regulation, platform regulation) and of 
competition law?  
b. If yes, what tools are in place to guarantee a coherent and streamlined enforcement within 
that authority?  
c. If not, do these authorities cooperate? Is there room for exchanges of information between 
them? 
d. Are authorities’ decisions reviewed by courts? Is there one court responsible for reviewing 
cases coming from different authorities? 
 
Under s54 CA1998, a variety of regulators have concurrent powers to enforce the Chapter I 
and Chapter II prohibitions: Ofcom; Ofgem (gas and electricity markets); Water Services 
Regulation Authority (OFWAT); Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation; Office of Rail 
and Road (ORR); Civil Aviation Authority (CAA); Financial Conduct Authority (FCA); Payment 
                                               
248 https://ico.org.uk/facebook-fine-20181025. 
249https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2018/03/blog-a-win-for-the-data-protection-of-uk-
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253 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-and-data-protection.pdf 
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Systems Regulator (PRS); and NHS Improvement. The CMA is the sole decision-maker for 
mergers.258 
Coherent antitrust enforcement was strengthened by the ERRA13 and the Competition 
Act 1998 (Concurrency) Regulations 2014, which facilitate information-sharing, notification of 
proposed investigations, and case transferral. The CMA has published guidance on the 
concurrent application of competition law in regulated industries259 and has agreed a 
memorandum of understanding with each enforcement body.260 Together they constitute the 
UK Competition Network, which aims to engage in strategic dialogue, cooperative 
enforcement and sharing best practices.261 Given the sectors overseen by the concurrent 
enforcers, there has been little engagement with digital economy markets beyond the CMA. 
One exception is an Ofgem investigation into the use of negative keywords agreements 
between energy PCWs, preventing their rival advertisements displaying in response to certain 
user search inputs. This investigation was transferred to the CMA and closed on administrative 
priority grounds.262 
With respect to consumer protection, CRA2015 enforcement is shared with Trading 
Standards Services (TSS), the concurrent sector regulators, ICO and the Consumers’ 
Association (Which?).263 TSS, operating at local government level, are also the lead enforcers 
of the CPRs. Case allocation is managed through the National Trading Standards Board and 
there is a legal duty to notify enforcement action. The CMA typically takes the lead against 
systemic market failures or practices with market-wide implications, where a legal precedent 
is necessary and if strong deterrence or compensation is required.264 The CMA is part of the 
Consumer Protection Partnership, bringing together other enforcement (National Trading 
Standards Board, Scottish and Northern Irish equivalents) and advocacy bodies (Citizens 
Advice). In 2019 the CMA Chairman recommended ‘entrenching a division of responsibilities’ 
for enforcement between the CMA and TSS.265 
Chapter I and II infringement decisions, findings of legality, commitment decisions, and 
penalties are appealable from the CMA to the CAT,266 while other actions can be judicially 
reviewed by the High Court. A person aggrieved by a merger decision can also apply to the 
                                               
258 The CMA consults Ofcom on local media mergers and NHS Improvement on mergers of foundation trusts. The Secretary 
of State may intervene in mergers that raise public interest considerations (n 77). 
259 Guidance on Concurrent Application of Competition Law to Regulated Industries (2014). 
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261 UKCN, Statement of Intent (2013). 
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265 Chairman’s Letter (n 56) 20-22. 
266 ss46-47 CA1998. 
 
2019/06 
 www.city.ac.uk/law 29 
 
CAT for review.267 Opportunities for the CAT to consider competition issues in the digital 
economy have been rare, though include accepting the “one portal only” rule in Agents’ 
Mutual,268 quashing the online hotel booking commitments decision in Skyscanner,269 and 
finding a non-decisive error of law in Ping.270 Concerns have been raised about the length and 
cost of CAT proceedings.271 The Chairman of the CMA also recently expressed dissatisfaction 
with the intensity of review by the CAT of CMA decision-making and recommended a more 
flexible standard of review for CMA fact-finding and legal analysis,272 a proposal echoed in the 
Furman Report.273 
 
  
                                               
267 s120 Enterprise Act 2002. 
268 See text accompanying n 142. 
269 Skyscanner (n 14). 
270 See n 171 and n 215. 
271 Chairman’s Letter (n 56) 2, 34-35, 37-38. 
272 ibid 12, 36, 39-40. 
273 Furman Report (n 58), 14, 106. 
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